This is largely because "progress" implies a degree not only of change but also of improvement, and historical accounting researchers, influenced by social science conventions, often regard describing accounting changes in terms of progress as involving improper value judgements.
As accounting becomes an object of study less as a technical and more as a social phenomenon, consensus as to what constitutes an improvement becomes harder to secure.
Within so-called "traditional" historical accounting research, use of a progressive narrative framework is not uncommon, although writers often describe accounting change as "evolution". This term has multiple meanings and connotations, ranging from a simple view of slow and gradual change to a teleological view of history tending towards some ultimate end or goal. In some interpretations, evolution is seen as inherently progressive, while in others no claim to progress is made.
In assessing the work of historical accounting researchers, care is necessary to ensure that their use of models of evolution or progress is accurately understood.
On a broader scale, the idea of progress has been seen as characterising modernity.
If accounting is itself regarded as progressive in the sense that the spread of accounting into ever-increasing contexts is regarded as a social improvement, then accounting is an important phenomenon of modernity.
With the emergence of the post-modern critique of modernity, it is therefore not surprising that accounting comes under criticism, and its diffusion is no longer seen as evidence of progress. However, progress remains a useful narrative structure for historical writing, although it has rivals in terms of stories of decline, stasis, and recurrence. Available historical evidence is often open to different narrative structures, but those attempting to tell a story of change through time will find it difficult to avoid selecting one or other structure.
Progress may have some attractions as a narrative structure for small-scale narratives of success, and even narratives of failure can be seen as progressive if we believe that we learn from past mistakes.
However, in terms of general histories of accounting, the alternatives of a story of unbounded progress and a view of progress as movement towards an end may be equally unattractive. This is especially the case where progress is seen in teleological terms, where "the end of accounting" may be its apotheosis, but may on the other hand be its extinction.
INTRODUCTION
In his pioneering history Accounting Evolution to 1900, A. C.
Littleton describes accounting in the following terms:
Accounting is relative and progressive.
The phenomena which form its subject matter are constantly changing. Older methods become less effective under altered conditions; earlier ideas become irrelevant in the face of new problems.
Thus surrounding conditions generate fresh ideas and stimulate the ingenious to devise new methods. And as such ideas and methods prove successful they in turn begin to modify the surrounding conditions. The result we call progress. (Littleton 1933: 361) Littleton is not particularly clear as to what he means by "progress", although he implies that it lies in the ability of accounting to solve present-day problems.
Littleton notes that accounting has not been static, and points to the growth in professional audits and the expansion of cost accounting as evidence of how accounting helps to solve problems of business planning and control. He claims to show how "accounting originated in known circumstances in response to known needs; it has evolved and grown in harmony with its surroundings; its changes can be explained in terms of forces current at the time" (Littleton 1933: 362 ). Littleton's historiography is a dynamic one: accounting "came from definite causes; it moves toward a definite destiny" (Littleton 1933: 362) .
For a long time, I have found this view of accounting change a puzzling one. It seems to embody a teleology: a belief that accounting has some ultimate end to which it is tending. The path to this ultimate end may not be a direct one, which suggests that accounting changes could be assessed by the extent to which they work towards the ultimate end (they are in that sense "progressive") or move away from the end (they are in that sense "regressive" evidence of the use of progress as an organising concept in socalled "traditional accounting history", it tends to be tied up with the highly ambiguous notion of evolution. The emphasis placed on evolution as a term describing accounting's patterns of change has been criticised by the so-called "new accounting history" Miller & Napier 1993 ), but, as Keenan (1998) has pointed out, this criticism may itself be open to question as presupposing a rather specific and potentially confused understanding of the concept of evolution. Nervousness about describing accounting change as "progressive" probably owes more to the fact that many historical accounting researchers (particularly those working within the "new accounting history" approach) come from social science backgrounds, where claims that evidence reveals a pattern of improvement over time might be held to be inappropriate value judgements. However, telling a story in terms of progress is often an effective way of structuring a small-scale historical narrative, whether we describe a "success" in which accounting, or something affected by accounting, is held to improve, or a "failure" from which we hope to learn lessons to help us avoid mistakes in the future. On a larger scale, it becomes more difficult to tell a story of progress, as we seem to have to choose between the equally unattractive options of seeing accounting as eternally changing in a generally improving direction or as tending towards its end.
PROGRESS IN HISTORY AND HISTORY AS PROGRESS
A dictionary definition of progress is: "An advance to something better or higher in development" ( Chambers English Dictionary 1990 : 1168 . This definition brings out the two central aspects of progress. First, it is a dynamic concept: a necessary condition for progress is that there should be some change.
However, change is not a sufficient condition: the change must be a change for the better. Progress can be seen as a process of more-or-less continuous improvement, and may in addition be regarded as progress towards some goal or end. Thus the philosopher Robert Solomon (1995: 722) (1962) , who suggests that later theories can be incommensurable with earlier theories. One aspect of this is that some at least of the problems of earlier theories simply do not exist as problems within the later theories, not in the sense that they are solved by the later theories, but rather that they are conceptually inexpressible in the terms of the later theories.
Laudan attempts to overcome this objection by claiming that progress is not a matter simply of the number of problems solved but also their significance or "weight" (presumably the previously solved problems inexpressible in terms of the later theories are simply not "weighty" enough to count in an assessment of the later theories). This move may not be very satisfactory, but the idea that theories (or indeed practices) can be assessed and compared by their ability to fulfil adequately some function may be a potentially promising one when we come to consider progress in accounting.
The idea of progress has been an important feature of Western historiography at least since the eighteenth century, although it came to be questioned in the twentieth century both empirically,
given that civilisation was observed by some to be declining, and methodologically, on the basis that judgements of progress involved making unscientific (and thereby unacceptable) value judgements. However, progress and its associated concept of evolution have continued to be powerful narrative models for the writing of history. In fact, as the philosopher of history Gordon In a model of evolutionary progress, the observer believes that recent history shows uniform improvement, but in the past there have been episodes of growth followed by decay. However, in each succeeding cycle of growth and decay, the best position is an improvement on the best of the previous cycle, and the worst position is also better than the worst of the previous cycle. Finally, Graham describes "revolutionary progress", where instead of cycles of growth and decay we have long periods of stasis followed by rapid improvement to a new plateau. Graham expresses a personal preference for evolutionary progress as "the most plausible form of progressivism" (Graham 1997: 63-66 ).
This raises the question of the connection between the concepts of progress and evolution. The problem here is that the term "evolution" covers a very broad spectrum of meanings.
Indeed, Keenan (1998: 652) suggests: " 'Evolutionary' is an adjective with a wide application and anything, perhaps, which involves processes and outcomes could be so described. To say, as [economic rationalists] tend to, that the routines found in the archive mist have represented the optimal trade off of costs and benefits (given the decision-making and other uses that economic rationalists wish to attribute to such routines) is empirically empty and essentially tautological. What is still generally missing is an historical explanation for why particular routines and their subsequent modifications were the ones that were actually chosen and why consideration/experimentation was not given to possible alternatives that may have been even more costbeneficial.
Analogies with biological evolution also become complex when some goal or end to the evolutionary process is imputed. One of the ways in which nineteenth century Christianity tried to accommodate itself to the emerging biological theory of evolution was to claim that evolution was simply the mechanism by which the world was moving towards the completion of God's plan (Ruse, 1999) . The secular variant of this saw evolution as the mechanism by which society progressed (Brewer, 1989) .
Evolution was broad enough as a concept to accommodate a range of positions from extreme laissez-faire (for example, the "social Darwinist" views of Herbert Spencer and others) to more interventionist views such as those of the Fabians and Progressivists. To some, evolution is seen as driving the world towards some desired end point (it is teleological), to others, evolution is a force for unbounded generally" (Miller & Napier 1993: 635) , and we see such rationalisation as in itself progressive, then accounting, as a form of rational calculation, has the potential to be progressive.
Of course, if we see the rationalisation of life as a bad thing, then we will be less likely to regard the spread of accounting as evidence of social improvement, and less likely to consider accounting as a possible force for progress. Laudan (1977) that progress can be assessed in terms of ability to solve more and weightier problems. Mobilising a problem-solving framework, an accounting historian would need to ask at what point in time does a particular problem emerge to which accounting might be a solution.
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The pace of innovation in different times and places could be explained in terms of the emergence at different points of a given problem. For example, the need to account effectively for business combinations emerges as a problem at an earlier time in countries with highly developed capital markets such as the USA and UK, than in countries where not only the way in which business finance is organised but also the legal structure of complex enterprises is different. In the latter case, the "business combination" may simply not exist as an object to be accounted for.
In terms of technical progress, claims have been made that accounting has been subject to periods of s tagnation or even decline. It would therefore not exhibit the pattern that Gordon Graham (1997) referred to as "uniform progress", with steady improvement from period to period. Raymond de Roover (1955: 409) described the period between the publication of Pacioli's Summa, Furthermore, some historians have pointed to a tendency for accounting changes to follow recurring patterns or cycles. Mumford (1979) noted that the various stages in the growth and decline in interest in price-change accounting in Britain over the 1970s reflected closely similar stages in an earlier cycle in the late 1940s. He put forward his cyclical model "as a blueprint for the next surge of inflation" (Mumford 1979: 98) , and also in part as a prediction (subsequently fulfilled) that, with the decline in the rate of inflation, price-change accounting would disappear from the agenda of accounting standard-setters, preparers and users.
A cyclical model has also been proposed by Nobes (1991) for UK standard-setting. 4 Nobes specifically addresses the question as to whether UK accounting standards in the 1970s and 1980s provided evidence of progress, defining this in terms of the ability of the standard-setter to resolve conflicts, discover unique answers or impose standard solutions (Nobes 1991: 271) . It is worth noting how by implication Nobes identifies progress in accounting with the ability to solve problems, where solution is defined in terms of obtaining "answers" or at least "consensus". Nobes adopts a rather Hegelian position by proposing that:
Progress may be inferred in t he sense that the [standard-setting] structure contained the seeds of its own destruction . . . The inability of the Accounting Standards Committee to identify or to state or to enforce the "right" answer on various issues led to the pressure to replace it with a body that might be better able to manage some or all of these matters. (Nobes 1991: 271) .
This illustrates a central problem with using a concept of progress in historical explanation: if we focus on a relatively short period of time we might observe a particular pattern of change (improvement, stasis or decline), but this pattern need not be the same as that observed over a longer period of time, within which the shorter period is included.
This situation is consistent with the "evolutionary progress" model of Graham (1997) already discussed, and it may underlie the relative lack of explicit statements about progress in much of the traditional writing on accounting history, as against the frequent references to evolution.
However, the "evolutionary progress" model implies one major belief: that, despite the possibility of setbacks in the past on the road to the present, today's observer believes that the current state of affairs is preferable to that at most if not all points in the past. How far is it reasonable to impute such a belief to traditional accounting historians using the term "evolution" in their work? A relatively brief examination is enough to show how several such historians say very little about the current state of affairs at the time they were writing. Thus
Littleton, writing in 1933, brings his book to a close in 1900.
Garner, whose classic work Evolution of Cost Accounting to 1925
includes no fewer than nine chapters on the "evolution" of However, far from considering the present to be "better" than most times in the past, they contend that "few of the major issues of today are unique. In fact, . . . they are often many decades old, and no nearer solution today than they were when first mooted" (Lee & Parker 1979: viii) .
Perhaps the most significant advocate of evolution as a structure for thinking about accounting history was the American Accounting Association's Committee on Accounting History, which reported in 1970. This proposed an objective for historical study firmly in the tradition of "modernisation theory":
By observing the evolution of accounting thought, practices, and institutions that has corresponded to evolution in the environment (including economic, social, political, and legal factors), it may be possible to suggest the practices and institutions which are more compatible with the environments of the developing world.
(American Accounting Association 1970: 53)
Of nine specific "examples of historical studies which deserve attention", no fewer than eight contain the word "evolution". But despite this predominance of evolution, it is unclear whether the Committee on Accounting History meant much more than "process of change", with some sense that changes in accounting may be a function of changes in the environment. It is in this sense that more recent historians seem to appeal to evolution. For example, Jones and Aiken (1995) , in their study of British company legislation of the nineteenth century, argue that "analysis of political and social evolution is . . . essential for explaining the timing and development of companies legislation of this period" (Jones & Aiken 1995: 61 There has been a tendency for technical histories of accounting to be written in isolation of their social, economic and institutional contexts. Accounting seemingly has been abstracted from its social domain with many of the understandings that are available tending to present a view of the autonomous and unproblematic development of the technical.
Where efforts have been made to offer alternative perspectives, teleological, evolutionary or progressive notions of change have often been implicit in the understandings presented.
. . . [M] any members of the committee were concerned about the partial, atheoretical and intellectually isolated nature of much historical work in the accounting area. (Hopwood 1985: 365-366) . What is most noticeable about these criticisms of traditional accounting history, however, is the almost complete lack of examples of the "defects" that Hopwood and others claim to identify.
Probably the most articulated critique of traditional historical writing is provided by Miller & Napier (1993) , but this is open to the objection that many of the examples of traditional historical accounting research provided were rather dated, even at the time the first version of their paper (Miller & Napier 1990) was written. That Littleton in 1933 may have been rather simplistic in drawing links between social and economic change on the one hand and accounting change on the other, and vague on how accounting fed back to help shape society, does not mean that all traditional historians should be tarred with the same brush.
The key feature of the new accounting history, as stimulated by Hopwood and developed by many others working within a wide number of theoretical perspectives (see for example Miller et al. 1991) , is that it is a sociological history written by social scientists. Hence, it is driven by a desire to theorise and generalise, rather than to particularise. At the same time, the canons of social scientific research, in particular a nervousness about appearing to make value judgements, have a significant influence on the form of argumentation. This is paradoxical, as many of the new accounting historians have felt distinctly unhappy with what they perceive as the illegitimate dominance of accounting in modern society. It has been argued forcefully by commentators such as Neimark (1990 Neimark ( , 1994 and Armstrong (1994) that this has tended to lead to tensions if not contradictions in much of the new accounting history, particularly that influenced by the French social theorist Michel Foucault. New historians wish to critique society, and accounting's role within society, while their theoretical standpoint tends to locate value judgements as relative to beliefs and systems of power extant during the period under study. This undermines the possibility of the very critique that is being sought, as there is and can be no independent standpoint from which any critique may be offered that is immune to accusations that it simply reflects a particular set of values.
On the other hand, Foucauldians argue that a Marxist theory of history appeals to Hegelian ideas of Universal History that have long since been exploded.
Perhaps at this stage it is worth appealing to the archive (Fleischman & Tyson, 1997) . In an unpublished working paper 6 that formed the basis of thought on historical accounting research of the 1977 Social Science Research Council committee discussed by Hopwood (1985) , Cyril Tomkins set out his view of the development of accounting. This contains a remarkable echo of Littleton (1933) . "Developments in accounting came about in the first place in response to economic social and political pressures, but, thereafter, acted as an enabling device to assist further developments" (Tomkins c.1978: 9, emphasis in original).
Moreover, it exhibits a degree of optimism that is often lacking from the new accounting history:
Despite the current criticisms, the long run record of accounting is distinctly encouraging. There have been occasions when accountants may not have reacted quickly enough to the needs of the day's society -for example the very slow pace (and sometimes backward steps) of increasing disclosure of information through the nineteenth and twentieth centuries and, more currently, the failure to produce acceptable inflation accounting rules and the lack of new methods to serve the special needs of developing countries where western (U.S.A. and U.K.) accounting practices are often of little direct relevance. However, if we take the broad span of history, accounting has on the whole developed as and when required. (Tomkins c.1978 : 9, emphasis in original).
Interestingly, Fukuyama (1992: 70) suggests that the pessimism of the twentieth century may have been overdone: "We need to ask whether our pessimism is not becoming something of a pose, adopted as lightly as was the optimism of the nineteenth century. For a naïve optimist whose expectations are belied appears foolish, while a pessimist proven wrong maintains an aura of profundity and seriousness."
Is there scope for optimism about accounting, and is it legitimate to tell histories of accounting progress? I consider these issues in the concluding section of this paper.
NARRATIVES OF PROGRESS
Within the study of history more generally, one of the most important debates in recent years has involved the consideration of the extent to which the writing of history does more than simply provide a "superstructure" (Goldstein 1976: 140-141) necessary to express in words the objective facts of the past.
Indeed, does the way in which history is written -the "narrative" of history -actually give meaning to the past (White 1987: 2) ?
If the latter, is there one "correct" narrative already implicit in past events, or is there the possibility of multiple narratives, and thus multiple meanings? Warwick Funnell (1998) has already examined this debate at some length, and what follows is a very brief sketch of the issues. On one side, there is the view that:
The historical method consists in investigating the documents in order to determine what is the true or most plausible story that can be told about the events of which they are evidence. A true narrative account . . . is a necessary result of a proper application of historical "method". The form of the discourse, the narrative, adds nothing to the content of the representation. (White 1987: 27) The role of the historian is to tell it "as it actually was".
Historians may want to explain why events happened as they did by appealing to some broader theory (and sociologically oriented historians will inevitably wish to take this route), but the historian's explanations are separate from the historian's narratives. Indeed, historians face a tension: a "scientific" as opposed to a "literary" approach to history seems to suggest that putting the historical facts into a narrative framework could lead to the danger of diluting objectivity. The aim of the historian, on this view, is not to "tell a good story" (Napier 1989: 241) , but rather to tell the true story.
However, in recent years strong arguments have been put forward, most notably by Hayden White, that the content and the form of historical narrative are inseparable. Moreover, there is no single true narrative: historical events can be ordered in a narrative -"emplotted" -in different ways. In his seminal work Metahistory, White proposes a series of standard emplotments 7 that can be taken by historical narratives: romance, comedy, tragedy and satire. In the romance, the hero of the story triumphs over the world: "it is a drama of the triumph of good over evil, of virtue over vice, of light over darkness, and of the ultimate transcendence of man over the world" (White 1973: 9) . In the satire, whose principal style is irony, it is the world that triumphs: "in the final analysis, human consciousness and will are always inadequate to the task of overcoming definitively the dark force of death, which is man's unremitting enemy" (White 1973: 9) .
Comedy and tragedy, on the other hand, hold out some hope of at least provisional victory over the world, the difference being the form that this victory takes. In comedy "hope is held out for the temporary triumph of man over his world by the prospect of occasional reconciliations of the forces at play in the social and natural world", while in tragedy "there are intimations of states of division among men more terrible than . . . at the beginning.
Still, the fall of the protagonist and the shaking of the world he inhabits . . . are not regarded as totally threatening to those who survive . . . There has been a gain in consciousness for the spectators" (White 1973: 9) .
To White, the choice of emplotment for a historical narrative is a choice of historical explanation.
As the same set of
historical evidence is open, at least in principle, to different emplotments, it can be explained in different ways. In a later work, White links emplotment specifically to stories of progress:
When Kant turned to the consideration of what could be known from the study of history, so as to be able to determine what mankind could legitimately hope on the basis of that knowledge, he identified three kinds of equally pertinent conclusions. These were that (1) the human race was progressing continually; (2) the human race was degenerating continually; and ( 3) the human race remained at the same general level of development continually. He called these three notions of historical development "eudaemonianism", "terrorism" and "farce", respectively; they might just as well be called comedy, tragedy, and irony (if considered from the standpoint of the plot structures they impose upon the historical panorama), or idealism, cynicism, and scepticism (if considered from the standpoint of the world-views they authorise) (White 1987: 65) So a view of general progress is emplotted as comedy, one of decline as tragedy and one of stasis or recurrence as satire. Miller is at pains to stress that issues such as the extent to which DCF was actually adopted, and the extent to which its use helped achieve the government's objective of faster economic growth, were not the point of his paper, which was to study how a particular issue is "problematised" and how DCF was mobilised in various programmes. As he concludes: "The 'failure' of the idealised programme within which DCF techniques was promoted can be seen as intrinsic to the very nature of such programmes" (Miller 1991: 738) . In the final analysis, the world always triumphs: the characteristic emplotment of satire.
As Berkofer (1995: 126) Progress narratives may be useful on the small scale, where particular episodes are under consideration, but are they valid at the level of the "grand narrative" of an overall history of accounting? It is at this level that I begin to be more nervous about whether such a "grand narrative", if it could be written at all, should reasonably take the form of a story of progress. If we accept that accounting is a practice that aims to carry out various functions efficiently and effectively, then it is only to the extent that these functions remain static that we can sensibly compare from one p oint in time to another how well accounting operates relative to these functions. If the functions of accounting change dramatically from one period to another, then such comparisons cannot be validly made. This is an evolutionary world where, so long as the environment is relatively static, we may hope to observe progress towards a better fit between accounting and its environment (particularly as movement towards such a better fit is helped by human agency rather than relying on chance). However, once the environment changes significantly, it no longer makes sense to talk of progress, as a degree of incommensurability enters into the comparison. The borderline between a relatively static and a significantly changing environment is itself not self-evident, and there will doubtless be cases where use of a progress motif will be problematic rather than clearly acceptable or inappropriate.
So I would conclude that it is legitimate for accounting historians to tell their stories in terms of progress when they are working on a relatively small scale, so long as they recognise that what is progress for some may be degeneration for others, and what appears progressive at one point of time may not seem so with the benefit of hindsight. It is certainly worth examining the extent to which those involved in changing accounting (not only at the level of national and international regulation but also within organisations) attempt to mobilise rhetorics of progress and improvement, 8 and the extent to which these are taken for granted.
But on a larger scale, suspicion about meta-narratives of progress is still appropriate, particularly where these involve teleologies.
We simply do not know whether the "end of accounting" will be its glorification or apotheosis as the dominant mode of economic calculation, or its literal end in oblivion.
NOTES 1 As Carr observes in a footnote, this passage appears in the context of a discussion of the collapse of the western Roman empire. Carr stresses that Gibbon was not being ironic in this paean to progress.
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There is nothing necessary about the extent to which the formulation of a particular problemits "problematisation" -and the ways in which solutions to the particular problem are pursued -"programmes" -admits or includes accounting (Miller, 1991) . Why certain issues are seen at particular points in time as problems of accounting is a legitimate area of historical enquiry.
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This has been derided as the "after Pacioli, nothing" theory of history by Zan (1994: 296) . 4 The Nobes (1991) study has been criticised by Skerratt & Whittington (1992) , who argue that the cyclical model is both underdetermined theoretically and non-descriptive empirically.
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The approach of Jones & Aiken (1995) has been challenged by several writers, among them Maltby (1999) , who asserts bluntly that "accounting does not 'evolve' ".
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A copy of this paper was provided to me by Anthony Hopwood in 1985. 7 These are borrowed from the work of the American literary theorist Northrop Frye (1957) . An issue addressed by Miller & O'Leary (1987) , in their discussion of how projects of national efficienc y, aiming to improve the life of the individual, and through this the nation, involved innovations in human accounting through processes of standard costing.
